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Syntax on Sin Tax: The Supreme Court of North Carolina 
Invigorates the Just and Equitable Tax Clause* 
[E]quity is a law in our hearts; it conforms to no rule, but to 




The North Carolina Constitution requires the power of taxation 
to be “exercised in a just and equitable manner.”2 For seventy-eight 
years after the language was adopted by amendment, the Supreme 
Court of North Carolina made perfunctory references to the Just and 
Equitable Tax Clause without addressing it as a substantive claim.3 In 
2013, Internet gambling parlors successfully challenged high license 
fees imposed on them by the city of Lumberton.4 The court agreed 
with the businesses that the new taxes were not “just and equitable,” 
and for the first time expressly held that the Clause functions as a 
substantive limitation on the government’s power to tax.5 But the 
court did not interpret the constitutional language or articulate a 
standard for applying the Clause, leaving its parameters yet to be 
determined.6 
 
 * © 2015 K. Dawn Milam. 
 1. GEORGE CRABB, CRABB’S ENGLISH SYNONYMES 467 (Centennial ed. 1917).  
 2. N.C. CONST. art. V, § 2(1); see also IMT, Inc. v. City of Lumberton, 366 N.C. 456, 
457, 738 S.E.2d 156, 157 (2013) (“While the decision to levy a privilege license tax is within 
the discretion of legislative entities, any tax so levied must be just and equitable.”). The 
Supreme Court of North Carolina has referred to this language as the “Just and Equitable 
Tax Clause.” See, e.g., Lumberton, 366 N.C. at 457, 738 S.E.2d at 157.  
 3. See Lumberton, 366 N.C. at 459, 738 S.E.2d at 158 (“While the Just and Equitable 
Tax Clause has been cited in several decisions, it has not been directly addressed as a 
substantive claim in its own right.”). 
 4. See id. at 458–59, 738 S.E.2d at 157–58. 
 5. See id. at 457–58, 738 S.E.2d at 157. 
 6. Id. at 462, 738 S.E.2d at 160 (“If the Just and Equitable Tax Clause has any 
substantive force, as we hold it does, it surely renders the present tax invalid. In light of 
the unusual facts we confront in the present case, and cognizant of the nearly universal 
deference by courts to legislative tax classifications, we do not attempt to define the full 
parameters of the Just and Equitable Tax Clause’s limitations on the legislative taxing 
power.”). 
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Meanwhile, the North Carolina legislature radically overhauled 
the state’s tax code.7 While dramatically reducing income taxes for 
wealthy residents,8 lawmakers increased the sales tax on mobile 
homes to a rate higher than comparable rates for either vehicles or 
site-built homes.9 Both the General Assembly’s expansive tax 
restructuring and the decision in IMT, Inc. v. City of Lumberton10 
(“Lumberton”) illuminate the complex political and moral 
considerations that influence tax policy. Though traditional criteria of 
horizontal and vertical equity provide a structure for analysis,11 a 
“fair” tax system is ultimately a function of one’s conception of 
economic justice. 
This Recent Development explores whether the Supreme Court 
of North Carolina could apply principles of tax fairness to overturn 
 
 7. See Jeanne Sahadi, North Carolina’s Republican Tax Experiment, CNN MONEY 
(Aug. 8, 2013), http://money.cnn.com/2013/08/08/pf/taxes/tax-reform-north-carolina/. Part 
of the proposal included a modified flat tax, which lowered the income tax rate on North 
Carolina’s highest earners from 7.5% to 5.8%. Derick Waller, Lower NC Flat Tax Starts 
Wednesday, But Many Will Still Pay More, WNCN NEWS (Jan. 13, 2014), 
http://www.wnct.com/story/24332326/lower-nc-flat-tax-takes-effect-wednesday-but-many-
will-pay-more.  
 8. See Mark Binker, Breaking Down the 2013 Tax Package, WRAL (July 19, 2013), 
http://www.wral.com/breaking-down-the-2013-tax-package/12678653 (noting that “[b]oth 
proponents and opponents of the plan acknowledge that the biggest breaks will go to the 
highest income earners”). 
 9. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-228.30(a) (2013) (imposing a 0.2% tax on 
transfers of real property), and Act of May 29, 2014, ch. 3, § 6.1(g), __ N.C. Sess. Laws __, 
__ (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-187.3) (imposing a 3% highway use tax on the 
transfer of title to a motor vehicle), with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-164.4(a) (2013) (imposing 
the general sales tax rate of 4.75% on the sale of “manufactured homes”). 
 10. 366 N.C. 456, 738 S.E.2d 156 (2013). 
 11. See infra note 61 and accompanying text. Though this paper begins with the 
commonly identifiable theories of horizontal and vertical equity, an individual’s beliefs 
about the world, experiences, and even religious faith will influence what she accepts as a 
“fair” application of these principles. See, e.g., Patrick B. Crawford, Analyzing Fairness 
Principles in Tax Policy: A Pragmatic Approach, 76 DENV. U. L. REV. 155, 179 (1998) 
(“All tax systems, progressive or flat, overtly redistributive or not, are moral schemes of 
consumption. It is a mistake to think that not taxing the rich at higher rates (and thus 
more) is somehow value-free or value-neutral.”); Susan Pace Hamill, An Evaluation of 
Federal Tax Policy Based on Judeo-Christian Ethics, 25 VA. TAX REV. 671, 673 (2006) 
(applying “the moral principles of Judeo-Christian ethics to the fundamental federal tax 
policy issues addressing the morally required level of revenues that must be raised and 
how the tax burden should be allocated among taxpayers at different levels of income and 
wealth”); Ajay K. Mehrotra, “Render Unto Caesar . . . ”: Religion/Ethics, Expertise, and the 
Historical Underpinnings of the Modern American Tax System, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 321, 
323 (2009) (exploring “the religious and ethical underpinnings of our modern tax 
system”). Even decisions about what is “like” or “unlike” treatment rely on some other 
source of valuation. Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 
546–47 (1982) (“Just as no categories of ‘like’ people exist in nature, neither do categories 
of ‘like’ treatment exist; treatments can only be alike in reference to some moral rule.”). 
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statutes that disproportionately harm the poor, not just those that 
harm business interests. The paper then contemplates whether 
judicial review of tax policy is an effective and desirable mechanism 
to address questions of economic justice. Part I presents the history of 
the Just and Equitable Tax Clause and the background and reasoning 
of Lumberton. Part II applies traditional tax equity principles both to 
assess the Lumberton court’s analysis and to pose a theoretical 
challenge to the mobile home sales tax increase. Part III considers the 
role of the judiciary in determining fiscal policy and evaluates the 
respective effectiveness of the political process and the courts in 
promoting meaningful public debate about economic justice. 
I.  BACKGROUND AND RECENT VITALIZATION OF THE JUST AND 
EQUITABLE TAX CLAUSE 
A. The Just and Equitable Tax Clause: Adoption and Application 
The Just and Equitable Tax Clause (“the Clause”) requires that 
“[t]he power of taxation . . . be exercised in a just and equitable 
manner.”12 The Clause was part of an amendment crafted by the 
General Assembly and adopted by North Carolina voters in 1935.13 
Prior to the amendment, all taxes on property—except home loans—
were assessed on a strictly uniform ad valorem basis.14 The tax 
provisions in the amendment replaced this requirement with a more 
expansive grant of discretion to the legislature.15 The new tax 
provisions allowed the legislature to classify different types of 
property and consider other facts and circumstances to determine 
property taxes.16 But this broad taxation power came with a limit: it 
must be exercised in a “just and equitable manner.”17 
 
 12. N.C. CONST. art. V, § 2(1). 
 13. See Act of Apr. 29, 1935, ch. 248, § 1, 1935 N.C. Sess. Laws 270, 270 (ratified by 
popular election and codified as amended at N.C. CONST. art. V, § 2(1)). 
 14. M. T. Van Hecke, A New Constitution for North Carolina, 12 N.C. L. REV. 193, 
193–94 (1934). An ad valorem tax is “imposed proportionally on the value of 
something . . . rather than on its quantity or some other measure.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1469 (7th ed. 1999).  
 15. Van Hecke, supra note 14, at 194 (“The proposed new constitution removes all of 
these limitations and substitutes four new ones: (1) The taxing power must be exercised in 
a just and equitable manner and only for public purposes; (2) local taxes may only be 
levied in accordance with general laws and under state supervision of local budgets and tax 
levies; (3) taxes for debt service are to be diminished by new limitations upon the creation 
of state and local indebtedness; and (4) the Governor is given the veto power over all 
legislation, including tax laws, not subject to popular vote.” (citations omitted)). 
 16. Id. at 194–96. 
 17. Id. at 195–96. 
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At the time the Just and Equitable Tax Clause was added to the 
North Carolina Constitution, at least one scholar believed that the 
Clause would indeed function expressly as a mechanism for judicial 
review. M. T. Van Hecke, then Dean of the University of North 
Carolina School of Law, published an article in the North Carolina 
Law Review to explain the key changes in the state constitution.18 He 
wrote to assuage concerns of “arbitrary and discriminating legislative 
action” that some North Carolinians feared the expansive new taxing 
power might engender.19 Van Hecke argued that courts could assess 
fair treatment in taxation just as they did in due process and equal 
protection matters: 
The new limitation that “the power of taxation shall be 
exercised in a just and equitable manner” invokes this 
protection. That this will give rise to new legislative and judicial 
problems of no inconsiderable factual difficulty, is not to be 
denied. That these difficulties are not prohibitive is evident 
from our experience with taxes levied on sources other than 
property.20 
For Van Hecke, the complexities created by judicial review did not 
prevent the Clause from operating as a meaningful limitation on the 
legislature. 
In spite of Van Hecke’s prediction, before the Lumberton 
decision, the Supreme Court of North Carolina had primarily cited 
the Clause either as part of the Public Purpose doctrine,21 which 
provides that taxation must benefit the public rather than the private 
sector, or in conjunction with the provisions for property taxes in 
Article V, Sections 2(2), 2(3), and 2(5) of the state constitution.22 
 
 18. Id. at 193. The new tax provisions replaced the constitution’s strict uniformity 
requirements and allowed the legislature more latitude in classifying property. Id. at 194–
95. Van Hecke explained that the uniformity requirements had, for instance, prevented 
the legislature from providing relief to “unproductive property” during the Depression. Id. 
at 195. He argued that the new provisions allowed the legislature to consider a number of 
contextual facts in assigning property tax values that would bring property taxes in line 
with other forms of taxation in the state. Id. 
 19. Id. at 195. 
 20. Id. at 196. 
 21. N.C. CONST. art. V, § 2(1); see Piedmont Triad Airport Auth. v. Urbine, 354 N.C. 
336, 338, 554 S.E.2d 331, 332 (2001); Maready v. Winston-Salem, 342 N.C. 708, 713, 467 
S.E.2d 615, 619 (1996). 
 22. See Smith v. State, 349 N.C. 332, 340–41, 507 S.E.2d 28, 33 (1998); In re Martin, 
286 N.C. 66, 75–76, 209 S.E.2d 766, 773 (1974). Subsection 2 allows the General Assembly 
to classify property for tax purposes, but only by “general law uniformly applicable in 
every county, city and town, and other unit of local government.” N.C. CONST. art. V, 
§ 2(2). Subsections 3 and 5 repeat this phrase as a requirement for tax exemptions and 
property taxes, respectively. N.C. CONST. art. V, § 2(3), (5). 
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However, the court had never interpreted the language or applied the 
Clause as a distinct substantive limitation on tax policy.23 
In fact, only two of the early cases appear to address the Clause 
directly, although both holdings principally rest on other doctrines. In 
State v. Harris,24 the court overturned a state license tax that applied 
only to businesses in certain locations.25 The court cited the Just and 
Equitable Tax Clause and explained that “[i]t cannot be successfully 
maintained that a tax . . . is equitably levied when a large number of 
the counties of the State are not included and citizens therein engaged 
in a like business are left immune from the tax.”26 In Nesbitt v. Gill,27 
the court upheld a graduated license tax on horse salesmen.28 Briefly 
referencing the Just and Equitable language, the court reasoned that 
exemption from other taxes may weigh in favor of a license tax’s 
validity.29 Instead of a check on legislative tax decisions, the Clause 
had become a mere preliminary incantation. 
B. IMT, Inc. v. Lumberton30: Just and Equitable as a Substantive 
Limitation 
In 2010, the City of Lumberton (“City”) amended the formula 
for privilege license taxes31 on businesses where “ ‘persons utilize 
electronic machines . . . to conduct games of chance.’ ”32 In prior 
 
 23. See IMT, Inc. v. City of Lumberton, 366 N.C. 456, 459, 738 S.E.2d 156, 158 (2013) 
(“While the Just and Equitable Tax Clause has been cited in several decisions, it has not 
been directly addressed as a substantive claim in its own right.”). 
 24. 216 N.C. 746, 6 S.E.2d 854 (1940). 
 25. Id. at 753, 6 S.E.2d at 859 (“[A]ny law which, purporting to operate on a particular 
class, places upon those engaged in the business in a portion of the State a burden for the 
privilege which is exercised freely and without additional charge by those engaged in the 
business in other parts of the State, is arbitrary in classification because it discriminates 
within the class originally selected and extends to the latter a privilege and immunity not 
accorded to those who must, under the law, pay the additional exaction or quit the 
business.”). 
 26. Id. 
 27. 227 N.C. 174, 41 S.E.2d 646 (1947). 
 28. Id. at 180, 41 S.E.2d at 651. The challenged statute provided for a graduated 
license tax that increased the amount owed according to the number of horses and/or 
mules purchased for resale. Id. at 177, 41 S.E.2d at 648–49. 
 29. Id. at 178–80, 41 S.E.2d at 649–51 (explaining that the sales of horses and mules 
were exempt from the 3% state sales tax). 
 30. 366 N.C. 456, 738 S.E.2d 156 (2013). 
 31. Privilege license taxes are “imposed for the privilege of carrying on the business, 
exercising the privilege or doing the act named in Article 2, Schedule B of the Revenue 
Laws of North Carolina.” Scope and NatureRules and Bulletins, N.C. DEP’T OF 
REVENUE, http://www.dornc.com/taxes/license/scope.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2015). 
 32. Lumberton, 366 N.C. at 458, 738 S.E.2d at 157 (alteration in original) (quoting 
LUMBERTON, N.C., CODE § 12-60.1(15) (2013), available at https://www.municode.com/
library/nc/lumberton/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=14291). 
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years, the privilege license tax on such establishments had been a 
fixed annual amount of $12.50.33 The new calculation taxed both the 
business location and the number of computer terminals at the 
location.34 At $5,000 per location and $2,500 per computer, each cyber 
gaming establishment would owe a minimum tax of $7,500.35 The 
amounts actually levied on the four companies challenging the tax 
ranged from $75,000 to $137,500.36 
Several businesses sued the City to prevent enforcement of the 
tax, but the trial court granted and the court of appeals affirmed 
summary judgment for the City.37 Responding to the businesses’ 
argument that the tax violated the Just and Equitable Tax Clause in 
Article V, Section 2(1) of the North Carolina Constitution, the Court 
of Appeals of North Carolina applied common law principles to 
determine that the tax was indeed constitutional.38 The central 
doctrine of Just and Equitable, according to the court of appeals, was 
grounded in the common law axiom that a “tax must not be so high as 
to amount to a prohibition of the particular business.”39 It was the 
relationship between the privilege license tax and the establishment’s 
revenue—not the prior tax—that determined the new tax’s validity.40 
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Robert C. Hunter acknowledged 
the common law prohibitive tax standard but suggested that the 
variation in the privilege license tax structure should preclude 
summary judgment.41 Judge Hunter argued that the significant 
disparity between the high taxes levied on cyber gaming 
establishments and the “modest” taxes imposed on other businesses 
should be at least a consideration in the equity of the tax.42 
 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. Cyber gaming establishments can generate a “tremendous amount of money, 
hundreds of millions of dollars[,]” according to Ohio Attorney General Mike DeWine. 
Pamela M. Prah, States Battle Illegal Gambling at Internet Cafes, USA TODAY (Mar. 24, 
2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/03/24/stateline-illegal-gambling-
internet-cafes/6829731/. Noting the problem with “largely unreported profits,” the 
American Gaming Association recommends that states strictly regulate Internet cafes. 
Internet Sweepstakes Cafes, AM. GAMING ASS’N, http://www.americangaming.org/
government-affairs/priority-issues/internet-sweepstakes-cafes (last visited Feb. 17, 2015). 
 37. IMT, Inc. v. City of Lumberton, 219 N.C. App. 36, 38, 724 S.E.2d 588, 590 (2012), 
rev’d, 366 N.C. 456, 738 S.E.2d 156 (2013). 
 38. Id. at 45–47, 724 S.E.2d at 595–96. 
 39. Id. at 45, 724 S.E.2d at 595. 
 40. Id. at 46–47, 724 S.E.2d at 595–96. 
 41. Id. at 48–49, 724 S.E.2d at 597 (Hunter, J., dissenting). 
 42. Id. (“[The amounts levied on the cyber gaming establishment are] in stark 
contrast to the modest annual license tax imposed on any other business, such as: 
CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 912 (2015) 
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The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the appellate 
court’s holding and rejected the common law approach to interpreting 
the Just and Equitable Tax Clause.43 The court observed that the 
common law cases cited by the appellate court predated the 1935 
amendment to Article V44 and that the amendment did not adopt the 
“unreasonable and prohibitory” language from common law.45 
According to the court, the new language—“[t]he power of taxation 
shall be exercised in a just and equitable manner”—possessed 
substantive power that had yet to be applied as an independent 
claim.46 
Noting the “tension” that arises between the government’s taxing 
authority and the constitutional limitation on unjust and inequitable 
taxes, the court quoted Rockingham v. Board of Trustees of Elon 
College47 to offer guidance: 
The pervading principle to be observed by the General 
Assembly in the exercise of [tax] powers is equality and fair 
play. It is the will of the people of North Carolina, as expressed 
in the organic law, that justice shall prevail in tax matters, with 
equal rights to all and special privileges to none.48 
The Lumberton court concluded that while striking a balance may be 
difficult in some situations, the “City’s 59,900% minimum tax increase 
is wholly detached from the moorings of anything reasonably 
resembling a just and equitable tax.”49 
The court refused to articulate the actual parameters of the Just 
and Equitable Tax Clause, citing the 59,900% increase as “unusual 
facts” that “transgressed the boundaries of permissible taxation and 
 
campgrounds and trailer parks, $12.50; bicycle dealers, $25.00; restaurants, $0.50 per 
customer seat with a minimum tax of $25.00; pinball machines or similar amusements, 
$25.00; bowling alleys, $10.00 per alley; movie theaters, $200.00 per room. Granted, the 
mere amount of the tax does not prove its invalidity. However, the discrepancy between 
the tax imposed by the Ordinance upon Cyber Gambling establishments and all other 
businesses, while not conclusive evidence of the inequity of the tax, makes summary 
judgment improper.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 43. IMT, Inc. v. City of Lumberton, 366 N.C. 456, 459–60, 738 S.E.2d 156, 158 (2013). 
 44. Id. at 460, 738 S.E.2d at 158–59. 
 45. Id. at 460, 738 S.E.2d at 159. 
 46. Id. at 459–60, 738 S.E.2d at 158. The court refused to consider the language 
merely “precatory,” explaining that “[t]he people of North Carolina placed the Just and 
Equitable Tax Clause in their Constitution, and we are not at liberty to selectively dismiss 
its relevance.” Id. at 460, 738 S.E.2d at 158. 
 47. 219 N.C. 342, 13 S.E.2d 618 (1941). 
 48. Lumberton, 366 N.C. at 461, 738 S.E.2d at 159 (alteration in original) (quoting 
Rockingham, 219 N.C. 342 at 344–45, 13 S.E.2d at 620). 
 49. Id. at 462, 738 S.E.2d at 160. 
CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 912 (2015) 
2015] JUST AND EQUITABLE TAX CLAUSE 919 
constituted an abuse of the City’s tax-levying discretion.”50 It did, 
however, point to Nesbitt to suggest a methodology.51 The Nesbitt 
factors—city size, exemptions from alternate taxes, and sales 
volume—would not be exhaustive, the court admonished, but would 
provide a framework for evaluating Just and Equitable claims on a 
contextual basis.52 To illustrate, the court referenced the “stark 
difference” between the tax levied on the cyber gaming businesses 
and those levied on other economic activities as weighing against the 
tax’s validity.53 
The most striking aspect of the holding is the court’s reliance on 
the percentage increase to overturn the tax. Though the court offered 
a caveat that “any large increase in a tax, or simply a high tax, would 
[not] alone be enough to run afoul” of the Clause, its holding 
references only the percentage increase as rendering the tax 
impermissible.54 Evaluating taxes solely on the basis of their 
relationship to past years’ taxes is not a particularly coherent or 
principled standard, one which lower courts are already struggling to 
apply.55 In contrast, a contextual approach—such as that modeled in 
Nesbitt and endorsed in Lumberton—does not rely solely on a bright-
line comparison of yearly tax rates. The court could easily apply a 
comprehensive analysis that looks at other factors, such as additional 
tax burdens or exemptions, the relationship between the tax and 
income or net revenue, the profile of groups or businesses affected by 
the tax, the necessity or luxury of the goods or services taxed, and the 
 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. The court noted that Nesbitt considered the “size of the city, sales volume, and 
exemptions from alternate taxes.” Id. at 461, 738 S.E.2d at 159. 
 52. Id. at 462–63, 738 S.E.2d at 160.  
 53. Id. at 462, 738 S.E.2d at 160; see also supra note 42.  
 54. Id. at 462–63, 738 S.E.2d at 160 (“While these competing considerations might be 
difficult to reconcile in nuanced cases, the case at bar is hardly nuanced. Here, the City’s 
59,900% minimum tax increase is wholly detached from the moorings of anything 
reasonably resembling a just and equitable tax. If the Just and Equitable Tax Clause has 
any substantive force, as we hold it does, it surely renders the present tax invalid.”). 
 55. See Smith v. City of Fayetteville, __ N.C. App. __, __, 743 S.E.2d 662, 665–66 
(2013) (“While we acknowledge a 8,900% tax increase is not as substantial as the 59,900% 
increase in IMT, we conclude the 8,900% increase violates the Just and Equitable Tax 
Clause for the reasons stated in IMT. Specifically, the City’s 8,900% ‘minimum tax 
increase is wholly detached from the moorings of anything reasonably resembling a just 
and equitable tax.’ Therefore, it is unconstitutional as a matter of law. Without a fully-
developed record and given the Supreme Court’s reluctance to further define a 
methodology for evaluating just and equitable taxation claims, we are unwilling to 
articulate a methodology similar to the methodology previously adopted by this panel in 
Smith I.” (quoting Lumberton, 366 N.C. at 462, 738 S.E.2d at 160)). 
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state’s interest in discouraging or incentivizing a particular practice.56 
This comprehensive approach would be more consistent with 
historical conceptions of fair tax policy.57 The next Part applies these 
conceptions to reevaluate the Lumberton court’s analysis and to 
propose a challenge to North Carolina’s recent increase of the mobile 
and modular home sales tax. 
II.  UNDERSTANDING AND APPLYING “JUST AND EQUITABLE” TAX 
POLICY 
If the Supreme Court of North Carolina indeed intends to apply 
the Just and Equitable Tax Clause as a “distinct and enforceable” 
restriction on the power of taxation,58 the potential challenges to 
current laws are limited only by the imagination of North Carolina 
attorneys. The scope of the Clause is still undetermined, its future 
lines opaque. The facts of Lumberton may be extreme, but the cited 
precedent, language, and reasoning are expansive. As Lumberton 
invites courts to address substantive tax policy as matters of justice 
and equity, creative lawyers have a unique opportunity to forge the 
purview of the Clause as a limitation on the legislature’s tax 
structures. Of course, there is no settled normatively “just” or 
“equitable” form of taxation. Questions of tax policy generate 
extensive debate because their answers ultimately rest on moral and 
practical considerations shaped by the contours of political ideology. 
A. The Essential Principles of Equitable Tax Policy 
Although the Lumberton court did not reference moral or ethical 
considerations in its opinion on the license fee tax, notions of just and 
equitable taxation are inextricable from political morality. Tax policy 
helps to shape our system of ownership and property rights; it 
implicates distributive justice principles as well as complex ethical 
issues.59 It necessarily raises philosophical questions about the rights 
and responsibilities that exist in both the relationships between the 
government and its citizens and between the individual and the 
collective. How much individuals should contribute and for what 
 
 56. North Carolina may be the only state to have equity language in its constitutional 
tax provisions, although this paper does not assess whether other states are 
constitutionally obligated to analyze whether a tax is fair. Because the state supreme court 
advocated a contextual approach to an equity assessment, a number of factors potentially 
could be relevant to North Carolina tax policy. 
 57. See infra Part II.A. 
 58. Lumberton, 366 N.C. at 460, 738 S.E.2d at 158. 
 59. See LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND 
JUSTICE 7–10 (2002). 
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purposes, which persons or what property should be exempt, and 
what specific post-tax inequalities are appropriate are all “morally 
loaded and hotly disputed questions about our obligations to one 
another through the fiscal operations of our common government.”60 
To assess fiscal fairness is to ultimately address questions of economic 
and social justice. 
Theories of distributive justice have generally incorporated 
principles colloquially known as vertical and horizontal equity to 
assess whether a tax is “fair.”61 This historical conception of fair tax 
policy, though not without criticism, is “a standard for evaluating 
differences in the tax treatment of different people: the principle that 
like-situated persons must be burdened equally and relevantly unlike 
persons unequally.”62 The basic “norms” of vertical and horizontal 
equity are thus corollaries of each other.63 Horizontal equity 
addresses fair taxation for similarly situated persons; vertical equity 
addresses fair taxation for dissimilarly situated persons.64 Measured 
on these traditional axes, a fair tax system ideally recognizes that 
“similarly situated taxpayers must be treated alike and that differently 
situated taxpayers must be treated in ways that reflect their 
differences.”65 
While simple in theory, both vertical and horizontal equity are 
complex in practice. Horizontal equity tends to be a less controversial 
“norm” than vertical equity,66 but it can be difficult to apply.67 If 
fairness requires that like taxpayers be taxed equally, one must 
identify the factors that determine like or unlike status. Historically, 
this analysis has considered substantive factors such as income, 
 
 60. Id. at 3.  
 61. See Richard J. Wood, Supreme Court Jurisprudence of Tax Fairness, 36 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 421, 424 (2006). 
 62. MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 59, at 12–13. See generally Paul R. McDaniel & 
James R. Repetti, Horizontal and Vertical Equity: The Musgrave/Kaplow Exchange, 1 
FLA. TAX REV. 607 (1993) (exploring whether the principles of horizontal and vertical 
equity contain any independent normative value useful to the tax policy debate).  
 63. See Wood, supra note 61, at 422.  
 64. See MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 59, at 13.  
 65. Wood, supra note 61, at 424.  
 66. See id. (noting that there is little debate about whether horizontal equity is a 
desirable policy norm); id. at 428 (explaining that vertical equity is less established as a 
“valid component of tax fairness”). 
 67. Id. at 424–25; see also David Elkins, Horizontal Equity as a Principle of Tax 
Theory, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 43, 44–45 (2006) (noting the practical and tautological 
difficulties presented by the theory of horizontal equity). 
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wealth, and consumption to determine the status of the tax base.68 
Vertical equity, a more progressive system of taxation, requires 
wealthier citizens to contribute more than low-income citizens.69 
Fiscal policy seeks to achieve vertical equity in either proportional or 
progressive structures.70 A proportional structure applies a common 
percentage tax on income (a “flat tax”) or consumption (such as 
North Carolina’s 3% tax on automobiles).71 Progressive structures 
increase the percentage tax as income or consumption rises.72 
These basic principles are subject to criticism, however, as they 
may exclude other political values essential to a thorough analysis of 
fiscal justice.73 But the discourse of horizontal and vertical equity is 
still “an excellent way to bring out the nature and complexity of the 
issues of political morality that tax policy must address.”74 The 
following two sections assess these principles and the issues they raise, 
first in a reconsideration of Lumberton and finally in a theoretical 
challenge to North Carolina’s recent sales tax increase on mobile and 
modular homes. 
B. Tax Equity Principles As Applied to Lumberton 
It is easy to see that the privilege license fee levied on gaming 
parlors in Lumberton was not strictly horizontally equitable with the 
fees levied on the city’s other economic activities, if one accepts that 
“economic activities” is the appropriate status classification for 
gaming parlors. Beyond that, the license fee equity issue becomes 
 
 68. Wood, supra note 61, at 427; see also John A. Miller, Rationalizing Injustice: The 
Supreme Court and Property Tax, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 79, 126 (1993) (explaining that 
“the possible indices of equality may be income, consumption or wealth”).  
 69. Leo P. Martinez, “To Lay and Collect Taxes”: The Constitutional Case for 
Progressive Taxation, 18 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 111, 116 (1999). 
 70. See id. at 116–17. 
 71. See id.; Highway Use and Property Taxes, N.C. DIV. OF MOTOR VEHICLES, 
http://www.ncdot.gov/dmv/vehicle/title/tax/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2015). 
 72. See Martinez, supra note 69, at 117. For example, the North Carolina income tax 
rate on the highest earners used to be 7.5%. See supra note 7. The North Carolina 
legislature created a mostly flat income tax in 2013, taxing wage earners at 5.8%. See supra 
note 7. This restructuring reversed a progressive vertical tax, in which the state’s highest 
earners contributed a larger share of income, and replaced it with a proportional tax. 
Although the higher earners will continue to contribute more dollars in the flat tax, the 
reduced rate is a regressive adjustment for the North Carolina tax code.  
 73. See MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 59, at 13. For example, Murphy and Nagel 
explain that “justice” in taxes must encompass not just revenues, but expenditures and 
benefits as well. Id. at 14–15. The authors also question the assumption that “pretax 
market outcomes are presumptively just.” See id. at 15. As noted previously, there is the 
additional issue of whether horizontal and vertical equity principles possess any 
independent normative content. See McDaniel and Repetti, supra note 62, at 607.  
 74. MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 59, at 13.  
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murkier. The common law approach, which the court rejected, 
measured tax fairness in terms of the fee’s relationship to revenue75—
a principle of vertical equity.76 Had the court applied a similar 
standard, it might have compared the gaming parlors’ net profits with 
those of other businesses subject to the annual tax. As Judge Robert 
C. Hunter of the appellate court noted in his dissent, though the 
license fee at issue was much higher than the fees levied on 
campgrounds, trailer parks, bicycle dealers, restaurants, pinball 
machines, bowling alleys, and movie theaters, the discrepancy alone 
would not render the tax invalid.77 Judge Hunter’s observation 
implicitly recognized that horizontal inequity could be mitigated by 
other considerations in vertical equity. 
Other factors may weigh in the analysis as well. For instance, the 
City of Lumberton, recently ranked number one in a list of America’s 
poorest cities,78 was very likely trying to curb what it perceived to be 
socially injurious behavior.79 The practice of imposing “sin taxes”—
which discourage culturally unfavorable behavior and/or raise 
substantial revenue80—dates back to the American Revolution.81 The 
more technical term, “excise tax,” refers to taxes levied on some but 
not all products.82 Excise taxes are thus an intentional deviation from 
strict horizontal equity designed to further some other social value. 
Moreover, if Lumberton’s gaming parlor businesses were generating 
 
 75. See supra notes 39–46 and accompanying text. 
 76. See supra notes 69–72 and accompanying text.  
 77. IMT, Inc. v. City of Lumberton, 219 N.C. App. 36, 49, 724 S.E.2d 588, 597 (2012) 
(Hunter, J., dissenting), rev’d, 366 N.C. 456, 738 S.E.2d 156 (2013); see supra note 42 and 
accompanying text. 
 78. See Christine DiGangi, The Poorest Areas in America, CREDIT.COM (Sept. 24, 
2013), http://blog.credit.com/2013/09/poorest-cities-in-america/. 
 79. See, e.g., Editorial, Tax ‘em to Death, NEWS & RECORD (Greensboro, N.C.), May 
18, 2012, at A14 (explaining that Greensboro and other North Carolina cities were 
enacting heavy taxes to discourage Internet sweepstakes operators). 
 80. See, e.g., Asha Rangappa, The Cost of Freedom: Using the Tax Power to Limit 
Personal Arsenals, 32 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. INTER ALIA 17, 19 (2013), 
http://ylpr.yale.edu/sites/default/files/IA/the_cost_of_freedom_32_yale_l_poly_rev_inter_a
lia_17_2013.pdf (noting that excise taxes are “powerful tool[s] to shape social policy”). For 
instance, two doctors at the Mayo Clinic have advocated implementing or increasing the 
tax rate on substances that contribute to poor health and social behavior. Michael J. 
Joyner & David O. Warner, The Syntax of Sin Taxes: Putting It Together to Improve 
Physical, Social, and Fiscal Health, 88 MAYO CLINIC PROC., 536, 536–39 (2013), available 
at http://www.mayoclinicproceedings.org/article/S0025-6196(13)00128-6/pdf.  
 81. See Brenda Yelvington, Excise Taxes in Historical Perspective, in TAXING 
CHOICE: THE PREDATORY POLITICS OF FISCAL DISCRIMINATION 31, 32 (William F. 
Shughart II ed., 1997). 
 82. James Sadowsky, The Economics of Sin Taxes, RELIGION & LIBERTY, Mar.–Apr. 
1994, at 1, 1. 
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substantial revenue, particularly from citizens whose median annual 
income is below $30,000,83 then a fairness assessment might look quite 
different. One could argue that it is indeed “just and equitable” to 
impose substantial fees on businesses that reap large profits by 
exploiting the poor. At the very least, there would be reason to 
question whether the tax increase was truly “wholly detached from 
the moorings of anything reasonably resembling a just and equitable 
tax.”84 But regardless of whether the Lumberton court reached the 
correct result, the opinion’s endorsement of the Just and Equitable 
Tax Clause as a substantive limitation offers potential redress for 
other dubious tax schemes. 
C. Tax Equity Principles As Applied to the Mobile Home Sales Tax 
Lumberton’s empowerment of the Just and Equitable Tax Clause 
potentially provides an opportunity for poverty lawyers to challenge 
tax structures that unfairly burden North Carolina’s lower income 
residents. The 2014 change to mobile and modular home sales tax law 
provides a timely and salient example. Prior to January 1, 2014, 
mobile homes were subject to a retail sales tax of 2%, with a 
maximum tax of $300 for a singlewide and $600 for a doublewide.85 In 
the summer of 2013, as part of comprehensive changes to North 
Carolina tax law, the General Assembly amended section 105-
164.4(a)(1) of the General Statutes to increase the sales tax on mobile 
homes to the general rate of 4.75%.86 The General Assembly also 
amended section 105-164.4(a)(8) of the General Statutes to increase 
the sales tax on modular homes from 2.5% to 4.75%.87 The legislature 
left intact the 3%, $1500 maximum tax on aircraft and boats as well as 
 
 83. See Christina DiGangi, supra note 78.  
 84. IMT, Inc. v. City of Lumberton, 366 N.C. 456, 462, 738 S.E.2d 156, 160 (2013). 
 85. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-164.4(a)(1a) (2011), amended by Act of July 23, 2013, ch. 
316, § 3.1(a), 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 860, 870 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-
164.4(a)(1a) (2013)); SALES & USE TAX DIV., N.C. DEP’T OF REVENUE, LEGISLATIVE 
CHANGES TO SALES AND USE TAX 1 (2013), available at http://www.dornc.com/
downloads/e505_9-13.pdf; see also John Murawski, NC’s New Tax Law To Increase 
Typical Mobile Home By More Than $2000, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.) (Dec. 27, 
2013), http://www.newsobserver.com/2013/12/27/3488433/ncs-new-tax-law-will-increase.html 
(“The mobile home tax now is capped at $300 for single-wides and $600 for double-
wides.”). 
 86. Act of July 23, 2013, ch. 316, § 3.1(a), 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 860, 870 (codified at 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-164.4(a)(1a) (2013)); Murawski, supra note 85; Sales and Use Tax, 
N.C. DEP’T OF REVENUE, http://www.dornc.com/taxes/sales/salesanduse.html (last visited 
Feb. 17, 2015). 
 87. § 3.1(a), 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws at 870 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-
164.4(a)(8) (2013)). 
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the existing 3% tax applied to other motor vehicles.88 North 
Carolina’s excise tax on transfers of site-built homes likewise remains 
at 0.2%.89 
For a singlewide mobile home priced at $40,600, the 2014 sales 
tax increases from $300 to $1,928.50; for a doublewide priced at 
$74,200, the bill rises from $600 to $3,524.50.90 In Lumberton terms, 
this represents more than a 500% tax hike. Not surprisingly, the 
increase primarily affects lower-income North Carolinians who 
purchase mobile homes as their principal place of residence.91 One 
Raleigh retailer who sells between twenty-four and thirty-six mobile 
and modular homes a year says his customers’ annual incomes range 
from $24,000 to $72,000.92 
The tax on a 1985 Bertram 78 yacht recently listed for sale in 
Wilmington for $575,000? Still $1,500.93 The transfer tax on a $200,000 
site-built home? Just $400.94 Both the mobile home tax’s percentage 
adjustment and the discrepancy with other property tax rates thus 
present a possible challenge to the new rates under the Just and 
Equitable Tax Clause as envisioned in Lumberton. 
For lawmakers restructuring the state tax code, the tax hike on 
mobile homes is purportedly about “tax fairness and tax 
simplification.”95 State Representative David Lewis, a Republican 
from Harnett County, asserted that “[i]t’s fair that the tax for the 
 
 88. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-164.4(a)(1b) (2013); see also Highway Use and Property 
Taxes, supra note 71 (noting that there is a 3% highway use tax on vehicles). Although 
mobile homes are sometimes purchased for recreational or investment purposes, boats 
and aircraft are more likely to be recreational vehicles than primary residences. 
 89. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-228.30(a) (“The [excise tax rate on the conveyance of 
real property] is one dollar ($1.00) on each five hundred dollars ($500) or fractional part 
thereof of the consideration or value of the interest conveyed.”). 
 90. Murawski, supra note 85.  
 91. See id.  
 92. Id. Under the new tax scheme, the sales tax on a mobile home could be up to 8% 
of an individual’s income. The United States Census Bureau calculated North Carolina’s 
median income at $46,334 for the years 2009–13. State and County QuickFacts, North 
Carolina, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/37000.html (last 
visited Feb. 17, 2015). The federal government defined the 2013 poverty threshold for a 
family of four at $23,550. 2013 Poverty Guidelines, DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/13poverty.cfm (last visited Feb. 17, 2015).  
 93. See Sales and Use Tax, supra note 86 (stating that there is a 3% maximum of 
$1500 tax on the retail sale of boats). 
 94. See § 105-228.30(a) (“The [excise tax rate on the conveyance of real property] is 
one dollar ($1.00) on each five hundred dollars ($500) or fractional part thereof of the 
consideration or value of the interest conveyed.”). 
 95. Paul Woolverton, Boost of N.C. Sales Tax Causes Sticker Shock for Potential 
Mobile Home Buyers, FAYETTEVILLE OBSERVER (Jan. 4, 2014), http://www.fayobserver.com/
news/local/article_60651121-ce9b-5173-96f8-2e4b7b6e4244.html. 
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same thing—a home’s a home—be roughly the same.”96 Even if 
Representative Lewis is right that mobile homes are more 
appropriately categorized with site-built homes than with 
automobiles, it is not clear why lawmakers did not simply apply North 
Carolina’s 0.2% real property transfer tax to mobile homes.97 And if 
mobile and modular homes are instead correctly categorized with 
vehicles, aircraft, and boats, their new tax burden is anything but 
similar. 
From a horizontal equity perspective, then, the new mobile home 
tax is clearly unfair. It taxes mobile homes at a proportionally higher 
rate than either site-built homes or vehicles, the two categories most 
logically similar to mobile homes. The vertical equity question is more 
interesting, and it reveals some of the uncertainties inherent in the 
traditional analysis. As a proportional consumption tax, the mobile 
home tax may be technically equitable: both the wealthy and the poor 
will pay the same sales tax rate for their mobile homes, while the 
indigent will continue to enjoy a tax break on yacht or jet purchases. 
A progressive structure of vertical equity envisions the converse 
because it considers the relative status of the purchasers.98 A 
progressive analysis would acknowledge the elephantine reality that 
mobile home buyers are primarily lower-income, while boat and 
aircraft buyers are likely to be wealthier.99 
Lawmakers also pursue vertical equity by reducing tax liability 
on necessities, such as food, where lower-income individuals spend a 
higher percentage of their income compared to wealthier 
individuals.100 For instance, a $600 housing payment is over 30% of 
the monthly income for a family living at the poverty line, but only 
12% of the monthly income for a household bringing in $60,000 
 
 96. Id. 
 97. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-228.30(a) (2013). Representative Lewis argued that 
mobile home buyers should have a similar tax burden to buyers of site-built homes. 
Woolverton, supra note 95. Buyers of site-built homes, claimed Lewis, pay the relevant 
sales tax on the building materials used in constructing the home. Id. Thus, according to 
Lewis, mobile home buyers should be forced to pay an equivalent sales tax. Id. But this 
argument does not account for the fact that mobile homes must also be constructed with 
materials equally subject to sales tax.  
 98. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.  
 99. See, e.g., Igor Volsky, North Carolina Lawmakers Ram Through Plan That Would 
Increase Taxes on Poor People, THINKPROGRESS (July 16, 2013), 
http://thinkprogress.org/economy/2013/07/16/2308621/north-carolina-lawmakers-ram-
through-plan-to-tax-poor-people-more-after-just-25-minutes-of-debate/# (noting that the 
sales tax on mobile and modular homes primarily affects lower-income citizens); supra 
notes 69–72 and accompanying text.  
 100. See 2 WALTER HELLERSTEIN & JOHN A. SWAIN, STATE TAXATION § 13.09[1] 
(3rd ed. 2010). 
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annually. While legislators and their constituents may disagree over 
what exactly constitutes a necessity or whether those items should be 
taxed, most individuals can appreciate that North Carolina residents 
must afford adequate shelter, food, and clothing. Vertical equity 
principles weigh in favor of decreasing the tax burden on these items, 
particularly in the context of lower-income housing like mobile 
homes.  
One important prospect for the Just and Equitable Tax Clause, 
then, is the opportunity to redress recent tax restructuring that raises 
taxes on low-income citizens. While it may be that the 2013 General 
Assembly has decided to impose a “sin tax” on the condition of 
poverty in North Carolina, the disproportionate burdening of the 
poor runs contrary to the philosophical underpinnings of the equity 
axes. Regressive taxation also contradicts the Supreme Court of 
North Carolina’s cited precedent: the requirement that “ ‘justice shall 
prevail in tax matters, with equal rights to all and special privileges to 
none.’ ”101 Under a Lumberton analysis, courts could assess both the 
current tax’s relationship to the prior tax as well as the contextual 
factors surrounding the new tax.102 These factors should at least begin 
with the issues implicated by the traditional conceptions of horizontal 
and vertical equity. For the mobile and modular home sales tax, the 
percent increase becomes even more problematic when evaluated in 
light of other factors, notably its disproportionate impact on low-
income North Carolinians and its dissimilarity to taxation of similar 
property. A court could also assess the nature of the purchase—
unlike most yachts, a mobile home provides many residents in North 
Carolina with a basic necessity of life: a roof over the heads of their 
families. 
III.  JUDICIAL REVIEW: REPLACING DEFERENCE WITH DEBATE? 
Beyond the consideration of how a court might apply the Just 
and Equitable Tax Clause, the weightier question is whether it 
should. Since Justice Marshall affirmed the necessity of taxation in 
McCulloch v. Maryland,103 the United States Supreme Court has 
consistently emphasized three themes within tax policy: the 
government’s power to tax; the importance of judicial deference to 
legislatures; and the need for an “exceedingly high threshold” to 
 
 101. IMT, Inc. v. City of Lumberton, 366 N.C. 456, 461, 738 S.E.2d 156, 159 (2013) 
(quoting Rockingham Cnty. v. Bd. of Trs. of Elon College, 219 N.C. 342, 344–45, 13 S.E.2d 
618, 620 (1941)). 
 102. Id. at 462–63, 738 S.E.2d at 160. 
 103. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 425 (1819). 
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render a tax unconstitutional.104 North Carolina has similarly given 
“substantial deference . . . to legislative tax classifications.”105 In 
refusing to articulate the parameters of the Just and Equitable Tax 
Clause, the Lumberton court cited this “nearly universal deference” 
to legislative tax classifications.106 
Nevertheless, in addition to overturning the license fee, the 
Lumberton court spoke broadly of the need to “protect the public 
from abusive tax policies.”107 “[T]his principle is even more 
warranted,” the court continued, “when the State has been 
constitutionally charged with ‘the duty to tax in a just and equitable 
manner.’ ”108 Although the court refrained from defining or limiting 
the Clause, it directed trial courts to apply a contextual methodology 
in assessing claims under the Clause.109 By defining the Clause as a 
substantive limitation and inviting lower courts to apply a case-by-
case analysis, the Supreme Court of North Carolina boldly introduced 
the question of tax fairness to the arena of judicial review. 
Furthermore, if the court was correct that North Carolina tax policy 
has a constitutional equity requirement, then the Lumberton decision 
potentially turns the tide of legislative deference in North Carolina. 
Considering that Van Hecke, and perhaps other legal scholars, 
understood the Clause as a judicial check on the legislature,110 the 
court may simply be eight decades late in assuming this responsibility. 
But one might still expect the court to retreat from this position 
as soon as possible, as it imposes the judiciary as a super-legislature 
on almost every form and function of taxation. Furthermore, as 
discussed in Part II, questions of justice and equity in tax policy are 
both complex and controversial.111 Yet the broader question of the 
judiciary’s role in fiscal policy is an important one. It suggests at least 
two significant considerations: the ability of the political process to 
achieve equitable taxation with minimal judicial review, and, to the 
degree that tax policy implicates moral considerations or protected 
liberties, the role of the court in introducing moral and political 
theory into public debate. 
 
 104. See Leo P. Martinez, The Trouble with Taxes: Fairness, Tax Policy, and the 
Constitution, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 413, 427 (2004). 
 105. Lumberton, 366 N.C. at 462, 738 S.E.2d at 159. 
 106. Id. at 462, 738 S.E.2d at 160. 
 107. Id. at 462, 738 S.E.2d at 159. 
 108. Id. (quoting Lenoir Fin. Co. v. Currie, 254 N.C. 129, 132, 118 S.E.2d 543, 545 
(1961)).  
 109. Id. at 462–63, 738 S.E.2d at 160. 
 110. See supra notes 18–20 and accompanying text. 
 111. See supra Part II.  
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A. The Democratic Process and the Public Knowledge Gap in Tax 
Policy 
The political process rationale for entrusting legislatures with tax 
matters assumes that citizens both understand tax policy and can 
assess its philosophical justifications.112 But one scholar notes that 
empirical studies do not support this assumption, explaining that 
“though the public may believe current taxation is unfair, when asked 
to specify what rate structure would be fair (based on income) 
respondents tended to choose rates remarkably similar to those 
actually in place.”113 In 2011, the Public Policy Institute of California 
conducted a survey that revealed California’s knowledge gap on state 
and local finances.114 Despite voters’ belief that they had substantial 
knowledge of the state’s revenue and spending practices, only 16% 
knew that K-12 education was the state’s largest expenditure.115 Just 
29% correctly identified personal income tax as the state’s primary 
source of revenue.116 The survey found that “[o]nly [six] percent of 
adults and [nine] percent of likely voters are able to identify both the 
state’s top area of spending and its top revenue source.”117 
While fiscal policy affects every American, it is painfully clear 
that the general population is not well educated on the topic, much 
less informed about how taxation relates to theories of equity. 
Moreover, while most individuals have an instinctive conception of 
fairness, fairness in tax policy is uniquely multi-faceted. A general 
sense of what is “fair” or “unfair” is unlikely to adequately encompass 
the moral, political, economic, and practical complexities that 
permeate tax policy.118 
 
 112. See Leo P. Martinez, Tax Policy, Rational Actors, and Other Myths, 40 LOY. U. 
CHI. L.J. 297, 298 (2009) (arguing that the “democratic process is not up to the task of 
dealing with tax policy”). Martinez faults the branches of government as well as the 
citizenry. Id. He explains, “The public seems largely ignorant of how taxes work. 
Decisions made by voters without a full appreciation of what is at stake. Existing 
commentary on the public’s perceptions of tax systems demonstrate that the popular 
concept of taxation diverges significantly from reality. It is nothing short of surprising to 
observe the extent to which people misperceive taxes and the system of taxation.” Id. at 
312.  
 113. Martinez, supra note 104, at 418.  
 114. MARK BALDASSARE ET AL., PPIC STATEWIDE SURVEY: CALIFORNIANS AND 
THEIR GOVERNMENT 5 (Jan. 2011), available at http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/survey/
S_111MBS.pdf. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Essay, What Do Women Want: Feminism and the 
Progressive Income Tax, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 151, 151 (1997).  
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The breadth of the issue further complicates the awareness 
problem. Taxes structure our society at every level, and questions of 
what should be funded and who will pay for it delve into the most 
minute of conceivable public purposes.119 Even if appropriate 
purposes can be agreed upon, lawmakers must consider mechanisms 
for collecting taxes, the base measurement (e.g., property, income, or 
consumption), and, of course, what categories of goods or services 
should be exempt from taxation.120 
Savvy politicians handily exploit public misconceptions or 
prejudices about this intricate and daunting subject. As part of an 
effort to restrict Pre-K eligibility in 2012, Representative George 
Cleveland, a Republican from Jacksonville, North Carolina, objected 
to a reference to the number of North Carolina children living in 
poverty or extreme poverty.121 He told state legislators that “[w]e 
have no one in the state of North Carolina living in extreme 
poverty.”122 According to Representative Cleveland, extreme poverty 
is “living on a dollar and a half a day . . . . I don’t think we have 
anybody in North Carolina doing that.”123 Representative Cleveland 
not only failed to distinguish North Carolina from a developing 
country,124 he ignored the reality that North Carolina’s youngest 
children may suffer the most from their impoverished 
circumstances.125 
 
 119. See MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 59, at 5. 
 120. See id. 
 121. Lynn Bonner, Jacksonville Lawmaker Says No ‘Extreme Poverty’ in N.C., NEWS 
& OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.) (Mar. 2, 2012), http://www.newsobserver.com/2012/03/02/
1897815_rep-rejects-poverty-label.html?rh=1; Chris Fitzsimon, Shamed to Reconsider, 
N.C. POLICY WATCH (Mar. 1, 2012, 3:00 P.M.), http://www.ncpolicywatch.com/2012/
03/01/shamed-to-reconsider/; Saki Knafo, George Cleveland, Republican Rep, Claims No 
Extreme Poverty In North Carolina As Preschool Cuts Weighed, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 
2, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/02/george-cleveland-poverty-north-carolina_
n_1317554.html. 
 122. Knafo, supra note 121. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Editorial, Preschool Education An Investment in State’s Children, STARNEWS 
(Wilmington, N.C.) (Mar. 5, 2012), http://www.starnewsonline.com/article/20120305/
ARTICLES/120309846?p=1&tc=pg (“Cleveland later explained that he was comparing 
conditions in the United States to those of people in Third World countries.”). The United 
States Census Bureau reports that more than 17% of North Carolina residents live in 
poverty. State and County QuickFacts, North Carolina, supra note 92. 
 125. See, e.g., Greg J. Duncan & Katherine Magnuson, The Long Reach of Early 
Childhood Poverty, PATHWAYS, Winter 2011, at 22, 24, available at http://web.stanford.edu/
group/scspi/_media/pdf/pathways/winter_2011/PathwaysWinter11_Duncan.pdf (highlighting 
“emerging research linking poverty occurring as early as the prenatal year to adult outcomes 
as far as the fourth decade of life”). 
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Defending the plan to restructure the North Carolina tax code in 
2013, Republican State Senator Phil Berger wrote, “Expect liberal 
elitists and their media cheerleaders to wage class warfare. They will 
fight to protect the unfair status quo that takes the fruits of your labor 
and gives it to someone else.”126 Such rhetorical appeals to class 
warfare and “makers and takers” preclude sophisticated analysis and 
arguably ensconce politicians from more precise discussions of 
fairness.127 What is unclear, however, is whether judicial policing of 
tax structures would be more effective to defeat prejudice and 
misconceptions. 
B. The Role of the Judiciary in Exploring Economic Justice 
The moral dimensions of distributive justice may have attracted 
more attention in the aftermath of the Great Recession, but “they 
have generated [a] less sophisticated discussion, from a moral point of 
view, than other public questions that have a moral dimension.”128 
Issues of “freedom of expression, pornography, abortion, equal 
protection, affirmative action, the regulation of sexual conduct, 
religious liberty, euthanasia, and assisted suicide” tend to occupy the 
field of social justice.129 Fiscal policy, however, is also a fundamentally 
moral issue. 
It is indisputable that tax policy is interwoven with other issues 
more traditionally viewed as social questions. For example, in 2013, 
the Supreme Court permitted same-sex couples to file joint federal 
tax returns, striking down a key provision in the Defense of Marriage 
Act.130 The decision in United States v. Windsor established same-sex 
couples as alike to heterosexual couples for purposes of federal tax 
benefits, signaling far-reaching changes to both social and fiscal 
policy.131 Other scholars have proposed a more direct approach to 
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highlighting indigence and inequality, suggesting that the Supreme 
Court could consider poverty a suspect classification under Equal 
Protection.132 Rising wealth disparity itself is a function of economic 
policy,133 and it raises complex moral questions of how much or what 
kind of inequality should be permissible. Where tax policy creates, 
reinforces, or ignores the growing chasm between the wealthy and the 
poor, the resulting hardships and remedies are just as much a moral 
concern as any so-called social issue. 
One possible factor in fiscal policy’s absence from the 
conversation is the judiciary’s traditional reluctance to involve itself in 
tax matters.134 As opposed to legislative politics, where rhetoric often 
serves elected officials better than incisive critique, courts welcome 
extensive, meticulous argument.135 Authors Liam Murphy and 
Thomas Nagel point out that “in defining individual rights through 
constitutional interpretation, [the courts have] had a large influence 
on the introduction of moral and political theory into those other 
areas of public debate.”136 The courts may likewise be instrumental in 
ensuring that the popular conscious both understands taxation as a 
moral issue and appreciates some of the complexities that drive tax 
policy decision. At the very least, the examination and interpretation 
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of certain provisions through litigation allow the public to consider 
not just how tax policy affects one personally, but, perhaps more 
importantly, how it treats others. 
This is not to say that judicial review of tax policy is necessarily 
desirable. Although the North Carolina judiciary is popularly elected, 
the legitimacy of the court’s intrusion into the legislative arena is still 
a concern.137 State residents may rightly suspect that entrusting 
significant decisions to many elected officials is more democratic than 
entrusting them to a few. Additionally, activist courts that abandon a 
time-honored deference risk creating a “vast wasteland of confusing, 
conflicting, and essentially unintelligible pronouncements.”138 But as 
long as North Carolina has opened its courtrooms to questions of tax 
fairness, it is worth inquiring whether judicial review offers any 
cognizable benefit. Increased public education and debate on the 
relationship between economic policy and social justice may be one 
such benefit. At the very least, judicial review may encourage citizens 
and their lawyers to recognize tax policy as a values-based system. As 
with other social issues, questions of tax fairness potentially produce 
more substantial public debate in the courts than through the political 
process. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has determined that the 
Just and Equitable Tax Clause operates as a substantive 
constitutional limitation on tax policy. The challenge for the courts 
will be to define the parameters of the Clause and determine which 
tax practices are so unfair as to be unconstitutional. But theories of 
economic justice rest on sophisticated moral and practical 
considerations. Traditional conceptions of horizontal and vertical 
equity provide a useful framework for highlighting the complexities 
implicated in questions of tax fairness. By applying these principles, 
North Carolina lawyers can present compelling challenges to current 
tax policies that disproportionately harm the poor, such as the mobile 
home sales tax. 
The judiciary has historically been reluctant to review tax policy, 
and the Supreme Court of North Carolina may well decide to step 
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back from determining matters of tax equity. However, unlike 
electoral politics, the courts provide a unique forum for substantial 
argument and analysis of economic justice. Judicial review potentially 
serves to emphasize and explore the relationship between taxes and 
political morality, engaging the public in meaningful debate about the 
contours of social justice. 
 
K. DAWN MILAM** 
 
 
 ** Special thanks to Jennifer Little for her thorough editing and critique, to the other 
editors and staff of the North Carolina Law Review, and to Ben and Carter Milam. 
